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Abstract—Over the years, researchers have proposed various
approaches to JPEG forgery detection and localization. In most
cases, experimental evaluation was limited to JPEG quality levels
that are multiples of 5 or 10. Each study used a different
dataset, making it difficult to directly compare the reported
results. The goal of this work is to perform a unified, large-scale
and fine-grained evaluation of the most popular state-of-the-art
detectors. The obtained results allow to compare the detectors
with respect to various criteria, and shed more light on the
compression configurations where reliable tampering localization
can be expected.
Index Terms—digital image forensics; tampering localization;
JPEG forensics
I. INTRODUCTION
JPEG is the most common format for storing digital pho-
tographs and a popular subject of forensics research aiming
to discover informative traces of prospective forgeries. One
of the most important problems in JPEG image analysis
involves distinguishing the number of compression steps that
an image (or a part thereof) has undergone. Local compression
inconsistencies are strong indicators of malicious forgeries.
Over the years, researchers have devised multiple approaches
to detect and localize such forgeries, some of which include
analysis of:
• pixel-domain traces aiming to reveal inconsistencies in
the JPEG blocking artifacts grid;
• AC coefficients distribution which is distorted by subse-
quent re-compression;
• first digit distribution in AC coefficients;
• and most recently traces automatically learned by convo-
lutional neural networks (CNN).
This study provides a fine-grained and large scale experi-
mental evaluation of popular state-of-the-art tampering local-
ization methods for JPEG images. The considered detectors
(summarized in Table I) represent all of the above-mentioned
types of JPEG compression traces. The presented evaluation
focuses on the aligned JPEG forgery scenario, i.e., where
foreign content is inserted into an existing JPEG image and
the resulting forgery is saved as a JPEG image with no
cropping but a different quality level. In contrast to most of
existing studies, which limit the quality levels to multiples of
5 or 10, the presented evaluation covers fine-grained quality
level selection with differences as small as 1. Such evaluation
sheds more light on the compression settings where reliable
localization can be expected and on the capabilities of various
detectors and their parameters.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly
describes the considered detectors. The adopted evaluation
protocol and the obtained quantitative results are presented in
Section III. Section IV concludes and extends the discussion
by considering practical implementation issues like computa-
tional complexity and auxiliary storage requirements. Finally,
Appendix A discusses the penalty of training oblivious detec-
tors unaware of the JPEG quality level. Example localization
results are collected in Appendix B.
II. INCLUDED DETECTORS
This section briefly introduces the considered forensic de-
tectors, their parameters and training protocols (see Table I
for a compact summary). Whenever possible, I relied on
publicly available implementations from the image forensics
toolbox [2, 12].
In my discussion I distinguish between oblivious and
quality-aware detection which rely on a single trained clas-
sifier and on separate classifiers for various quality levels Q2,
respectively. The detectors discussed in the literature typically
adopt the quality-aware approach. I investigate the perfor-
mance penalty between the two approaches in Appendix A.
A. Blocking Artifacts Grid Analysis [1]
The algorithm proposed by Li et al. [1] exploits potential
inconsistencies in the blocking artifacts grid (BAG) that stems
from independent processing of image blocks by the JPEG
compressor and which reflects the original blocking structure
with non-overlapping 8× 8 px blocks.
The scheme operates by detecting the blocking grid with
a second-order difference filter and extracting lines matching
periodicity of 8 px. The process generates a BAG image, which
may be used to spot prospective forgeries. In order to detect
forgeries automatically, the authors propose to compare the the
BAG image values within central 6×6 px regions of each block
(where no blocking artifacts are expected) with the remaining
border. Such an approach should work best for non-aligned
JPEG forgeries (with obvious grid discontinuities), and for
aligned forgeries with low Q1 and high Q2 (with weak or
missing blocking artifacts in the tampered region).
The resulting tampering map is not normalized, and contains
scores that are widely distributed and poorly separated be-
tween the two considered classes (single and double compres-
sion, see Fig. 1). In order to normalize the maps to the common
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE CONSIDERED JPEG FORGERY DETECTORS
Year Acronym Trace Authors Analysis Resolution Tested Implementation
2009 BAG Blocking Artifacts Grid Li et al. [1] 8× 8 px Image Forensics Toolbox [2]
2009 CDA DCT Coefficients Distribution Analysis Lin et al. [3] 8× 8 px Image Forensics Toolbox [2]
2011 I-CDA DCT Coefficients Distribution Analysis Bianchi et al. [4] 8× 8 px Authors’ website [5]
2012 BG-CDA DCT Coefficients Distribution Analysis Bianchi and Piva [6] 8× 8 px Authors’ website [5]
2014 FDF-A Mode-Based First Digit Features Amerini et al. [7] 64× 64 px Image Forensics Toolbox [2]
2016 FDF-(W /F)a Multi-scale Mode-Based First Digit Features Korus and Huang [8] 16× 16 - 128× 128 px Own implementation [9]
2017 CAGI Content-aware Blocking Grid Analysis Iakovidou et al. [10] n/a Image Forensics Toolbox [2]
2017 CNN Pixel-domain Convolutional Neural Network Barni et al. [11] 64× 64 px Own implementation
a W denotes the analysis window size, i.e., FDF-64 represents a detector operating on 64× 64 px windows
range [0, 1], I post-processed the response by a logistic non-
linearity:
f(x) =
1
1 + e−φ1(x+φ2)
, (1)
with φ2 = 0 and empirically chosen φ1 = 0.005.
B. DCT Coefficients Distribution Analysis [3]
AC coefficients in natural images are distributed according
to a generalized Gaussian distribution. In singly compressed
images, the coefficients are integers but the character of the
distribution remains the same, and the probabilities smoothly
decay as the coefficient magnitude grows. Double compression
with a different quality level introduces characteristic periodic
peaks or holes in the distribution. The detector proposed by Lin
et al. [3] exploits this phenomenon for localizing individual
tampered blocks.
The algorithm computes local tampering probabilities by
means of naive Bayes inference, where conditional probabil-
ities are estimated from global mixed empirical histograms
(computed for individual DCT frequencies):
P (tj = 1|xij) =
P (xij |tj = 1)
P (xij |tj = 1) + P (xij |tj = 0)
, (2)
where tj = 1 denotes the binary decision tampered for image
block j, and xij represents the observed value of an AC
coefficient at frequency i in block j. Probability estimates
from individual frequencies are then combined together to
yield a tampering probability map with block level resolution
(8×8 px). Due to stronger quantization, high-frequency coef-
ficients are typically not used. By default, the implementation
of the algorithm in the image forensics toolbox [2] analyzes
the first 15 coefficients.
The authors also discuss a tampering detection approach,
which extracts 4 features from the computed tampering prob-
ability map, and trains a machine learning classifier to predict
the tampering state on the image-level.
C. DCT Coefficients Distribution Analysis [4]
The detector proposed by Bianchi et al. [4] is an extension
of the Lin’s detector [3]. The improved version recognized that
the empirical distribution of the DCT coefficients is actually
a mixture of two components coming from the original and
the tampered regions. The authors proposed a simple approx-
imation, which allows to estimate the expected distribution of
the singly compressed image with the same quality factor. The
following conditionals are considered:
P (xij |tj = 1) = h˜(xij) ,
P (xij |tj = 0) = n(xij)h˜(xij), xij 6= 0 ,
(3)
which lead to a simple detector:
P (tj = 1) =
 ∏
i|xij 6=0
ni(x
i
j)
−1 , (4)
where n(x) is the number of bins that map to the current bin
of the histogram for a given combination of (Q1, Q2); h˜(xi)
is the expected histogram for a singly compressed image with
Q2 (estimated from a shifted version of the image).
Similarly to the original algorithm, the available implemen-
tation of this detector also by default uses the first 15 AC
coefficients.
D. DCT Coefficients Distribution Analysis [6]
In a follow up study, Bianchi and Piva consider two separate
cases of double JPEG compression, with aligned and non-
aligned blocking grids [6]. Similarly to the original study [4],
the algorithm considers a mixture of two distributions, but
uses a more accurate probability distribution models and a
more elaborate Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm for
parameter estimation.
The available implementation of the algorithm uses the
first 6 AC coefficients (consistently with the recommendation
from the original research paper) and returns log likelihood
ratios (LLRs). In order to convert the results to tampering
probabilities, I use a logistic nonlinearity (1) with φ1 = 0.05
and φ2 = 60. The parameters were chosen empirically on a
small sub-set of test images in order to enhance separation
between conditional response distributions (see Fig. 1).
E. Mode-Based First Digit Features [7]
Double JPEG compression disturbs not only AC coefficient
statistics, but also the statistics of their first digits, which are
expected to follow the Benford’s law in singly compressed
images [13]. This detection approach treats the frequencies of
successive digits as features, and trains a classifier to distin-
guish between single and double compression. The frequencies
are counted separately for different DCT frequencies, hence
the feature set is typically referred to as mode-based first-digit
features (MBFDF). For the sake of notation brevity, I use a
shorter acronym FDF.
The algorithm for tampering localization proposed by
Amerini et al. [7] uses frequencies of 3 digits for 9 AC
coefficients (27 features in total) extracted from 64 × 64 px
windows. The images are analyzed in a sliding window man-
ner. The authors considered quality-aware detection and used
support vector machine (SVM) classifiers with a multilayer
perceptron (MLP) kernel. The classifiers were trained on
1920 examples (per-class) extracted from 40 training images
(from the UCID dataset [14]) and representing quality factors
Q1, Q2 ∈ {50, 55, . . . , 95}. In order to enable analysis of
images with arbitrary quality levels, the detector chooses the
classifier for the closest available level.
In my experiments I used a publicly available implementa-
tion from the image forensics toolbox [2] with the included
pre-trained classifiers. The algorithm returns distances from
the classifiers’ separating hyperplane, which are converted to
probabilities by a logistic nonlinearity (1) with φ1 = 1 and
φ2 = 0 (see Fig. 1 for conditional response distributions).
F. Muli-scale Mode-Based First Digit Features [8]
The algorithm proposed by Korus and Huang also uses
MBFDF features but adopts a multi-scale approach which
involves multiple detectors operating on sliding windows of
various sizes (ranging from 16 × 16 px to 128 × 128px).
Candidate maps are generated with full window attribution,
i.e., the score for each image block is averaged from all
windows that overlap it. Such obtained candidate response
maps are then fused together into a single decision map which
aims to combine the benefits of small-scale and large-scale
analysis. The authors considered frequencies of 9 digits for 20
modes (180 features in total) and used SVMs with radial basis
(RBF) kernels trained on 10,000 examples (per-class) extracted
from 1,338 images (also from the UCID dataset) representing
quality levels Q1, Q2 ∈ {50, 51, . . . , 100}. The originally
described detector adopts the quality-aware approach. Com-
parison with oblivious detection can be found in Appendix A.
The original study considered various fusion procedures to
generate the final decision map. In this paper, I use the EM
fusion based on a Markov random field model. This algorithm
has 4 key parameters: decision bias α, interaction strength
β, threshold drift δ, and candidate map rejection threshold
ρ. The impact of these parameters on achievable localiza-
tion performance is discussed in Section 2. For a detailed
discussion of their operation, the readers are referred to the
original study [8]. In this evaluation, I used a slightly extended
version of the fusion model with interactions among 8 nearest
neighbors and with modulated threshold drift (see [15] for
details). For the sake of lower computational complexity and
TABLE II
DEEP LEARNING NETWORK ARCHITECTURE OF THE CONSIDERED JPEG
FORGERY DETECTOR: LAYER SIZE REFERS TO THE NUMBER OF FILTERS
(FOR CONVOLUTIONAL LAYERS) OR NEURONS (FULLY CONNECTED).
Layer Kernel size Stride #Size Padding
Convolution 5× 5 1 30 2
Pooling 2× 2 2 - -
Convolution 5× 5 1 30 2
Pooling 2× 2 2 - -
Convolution 5× 5 1 30 2
Pooling 2× 2 2 - -
Fully connected - - 500 -
RELU - - - -
Fully connected - - 2 -
Softmax - - - -
limited impact on quantitative evaluation, I did not use content-
adaptive interactions.
G. Content-aware Blocking Grid Analysis [10]
This algorithm proposed by Iakovidou et al. [10] exploits
blocking artifacts grid (BAG) inconsistencies to detect and
localize potential JPEG forgeries. At the time of writing, there
was no public description of the algorithm (the paper was still
under review). I used an open source implementation available
in the image forensics toolbox [2].
The detector produces two response maps: a regular and
an inverted one. Due to poor performance of the latter, I will
present the results only for the regular one.
H. Convolutional Neural Networks [11]
Barni et al. discuss [11] 3 variants of deep-learning-based
detectors with automatic feature extraction from: bitmap image
patches, noise residuals, and AC coefficient histograms. They
consider two network architectures based on convolutional
neural networks (CNN) which are minor modifications of the
well-known LeNet network [16].
In this study, I used noise residuals as the network input1.
The architecture of the CNN is summarized in Table II.
The input patches are of size 64 × 64 px. The residuals
are computed with a popular denoising filter [17] on the
luminance component extracted from YCbCr representation.
I used 200,000 image patches for training (100,000 per class)
obtained from 200 diverse 2 Mpx photographs taken by the
same 4 cameras as the test images (the images were not in
the test set). The quality levels were chosen randomly from
Q1, Q2 ∈ {80, 81, . . . , 100} with Q2 > Q1. Similarly to
previous approaches, the consider primarily quality-aware de-
tection. Evaluation of performance gap for oblivious detection
can be found in Appendix A.
I also tried to train the network on a different dataset, e.g.,
on grayscale UCID images that I used for training the SVMs
for the FDF detectors. However, I did not obtain satisfactory
results. While the classifier appeared to be converging, it later
1I also tried the bitmap patches but could not obtain training convergence
in my experimental setup.
BAG (64.5% for τ=0.37) CAGI (acc. 64.2% for τ=0.24) CDA (acc. 75.7% for τ=0.27) I-CDA (acc. 88.5% for τ=0.49) BG-CDA (acc. 79.5% for τ=0.45)
FDF-A (acc. 64.6% for τ=0.24) FDF-16 (acc. 84.4% for τ=0.57) FDF-64 (acc. 89.0% for τ=0.22) FDF-128 (acc. 84.8% for τ=0.04) CNN (acc. 84.6% for τ=0.08)
Fig. 1. Conditional distributions of local detectors’ responses for authentic (green) and tampered (red) areas; the distributions were obtained by randomly
sampling 100 responses for 5% of test images; the reported numbers correspond to a hypothetical classification accuracy for the given distributions and the
best threshold.
yielded nearly random results on the test images. This suggests
that this approach has rather limited generalization capabilities.
III. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section describes in detail the utilized dataset, the
adopted evaluation protocol, and the obtained results.
A. Dataset Preparation
In this study, I used my recent dataset with realistic forg-
eries [15, 18] (available for download from my website [19]).
The dataset contains 220 cases with various realistic forg-
eries including copy-move, splicing, inpainting, subtle color
changes, etc. The included images are uncompressed TIFF
bitmaps of size 1920×1080 px. In order to obtain test cases in
the JPEG format, I automatically re-inserted tampered regions
from uncompressed modified images into singly compressed
original JPEG images. The resulting forgeries were then saved
as JPEG with the second quality factor Q2 ≥ Q1. The quality
factors were chosen randomly from: Q1 ∈ {80, 81, . . . , 100},
and Q2 ∈ {Q1, Q1 + 1, . . . , 100}. In total, I generated 4,620
test cases with an average number of 20 cases (minimum of 9
and maximum of 36) per quality level combination (Q1, Q2).
B. Evaluation Protocol
All of the considered detectors yield tampering probability
maps, with responses normalized to [0,1]. If an existing im-
plementation returned different scores (e.g, LLRs), they were
post-processed to obtain proper normalization (see Section II).
For each response map, a decision threshold was swept with
39 values uniformly distributed in [0,1]. The resulting binary
maps were cleaned by removing small connected components
(smaller than 4 image blocks). In case of random field-based
fusion methods, no post-processing was performed.
Each binary decision map was compared with a sub-
sampled ground truth map (down to 240 × 135 to match
localization resolution of 8×8 px image blocks). The following
performance metrics were collected: true positive rate, false
positive rate, and F1 score. The former classification rates
were used to plot receiver operation characteristics (ROC) and
compute area under curve (AUC) metrics for 3 maximal false
positive rates - fp ≤ fˆp : fˆp ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2}, respectively,
i.e.:
AUCfˆp =
1
fˆp
∫ fˆp
0
t˜p(fp) dfp (5)
where t˜p(fp) denotes an interpolated ROC curve obtained
using the piecewise cubic Hermite interpolating polynomial - a
shape-preserving interpolation method. The fit was performed
to match empirical (fp, tp) samples supplemented with (0,1)
and (1,0) to ensure a full curve. Division by fˆp ensures score
normalization to range [0,1].
C. Conditional Distributions of Detectors’ Responses
Fig. 1 shows conditional distributions of the detectors’
responses obtained by randomly sampling 100 scores from
5% of all test images. The presented histograms were mildly
smoothed by a moving average filter. The reported numbers
correspond to the maximal hypothetical classification accu-
racies estimated from the obtained distributions based on a
simple threshold test (the optimal threshold τ is also given).
It can be observed that both detectors based on blocking
artifacts grid analysis (BAG and CAGI) deliver similar and
rather poor separation between the scores in authentic and
tampered regions. Surprisingly, the MBFDF-based detector
proposed by Amerini et al. (FDF-A) also performs rather
poorly and yields highly overlapping distributions. The best
separation between the responses can be observed for the I-
CDA and the FDF-64 detectors.
D. Parameter Selection
As already introduced in Section II-F, the multi-scale fusion
algorithm has four important parameters: decision bias α,
interaction strength β, threshold drift δ, and candidate map
rejection threshold ρ. In this section, I describe preliminary
experiments performed to guide parameter selection.
The preliminary experiments were run on 66 randomly
selected images (≈ 1.4% of the whole dataset) and with only
first 4 candidate maps (instead of the whole set of 8 maps). I
performed grid search with the following scope:
• α ∈ [−1.5, 1.5] with step 0.25,
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Fig. 2. Impact of multi-scale fusion parameters on two localization performance metrics: F1 score (top) and AUC0.1 (bottom); Columns 1-4 show the
maximal performance metric achievable for a fixed value of a single parameter; Columns 5-6 show the ROC curve and the F1 score vs. decision threshold
dependency; The results were obtained on 66 randomly chosen test cases and the fusion combined 4 out of 8 available candidate maps.
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Fig. 3. Tampering localization performance for all 4,620 test images: (left) maximal average F1 scores; (right) AUC scores for fˆp = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2.
• β ∈ [0, 2.25] with step 0.25,
• δ ∈ [0, 0.15] with step 0.025,
• ρ ∈ [0, 0.2] with step 0.05,
and recorded the metrics reported in Section III-B. I focused
on two key metrics: the maximal average F1 score, and
AUC0.1. The obtained results (Fig. 2) show that proper choice
of the parameters allows to significantly change the behavior
of the algorithm and meet different requirements. Columns 1-
4 show the maximal scores achievable for a fixed choice of a
single parameter. The remaining two columns show the ROC
curve and a F1 score vs. decision threshold τ dependency.
When optimizing the F1 score, the best results were ob-
tained for α = 0.25, β = 1.25, δ = 0.125, ρ = 0.05.
The average F1 score achieved the greatest value (0.759) for
threshold τ = 0.55, whereas the best candidate map yielded
0.715 (see 6th column in Fig. 2). At the same time, the ROC
curve (5th column) roughly follows the best candidate maps
- with slightly better performance for fp > 0.1 and slightly
worse for fp < 0.1.
When optimizing for best low false positive performance
(AUC0.1) the obtained results are quite different. The param-
eters with best performance were α = 1.5, β = 0.25, δ =
0.15, ρ = 0.2. The most important difference stems from the
candidate map rejection threshold ρ. As can be observed in 4th
column of Fig. 2 it has different impact for the two considered
performance metrics. Greater values of the threshold mean that
more unreliable candidate maps will be rejected, leading to
significantly improved false positive performance and a fixed
limit on the achievable true positive rate (≈ 0.85). For this
case, the maximal obtained F1 score was the same as for the
best input candidate map (0.715).
Since the obtained parameter sets for the considered met-
rics lead to significantly different behavior, In the following
evaluation I consider two variants of the detector. They will
be referred to as FDF-F/F1 and FDF-F/AUC.
E. Overall Localization Performance
This section discusses overall localization performance mea-
sured for all 4,620 test images. I collected the obtained results
in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 which show the best average F1 scores, the
AUC scores and the receiver operation characteristics (ROC).
The main observations can be summarized as follows:
1) Blocking grid analysis: Both algorithms based on block-
ing artifacts grid (BAG and CAGI) deliver very poor perfor-
mance. While the newer CAGI algorithm is slightly better,
the improvement is marginal and does not suffice to make it
a feasible solution for dealing with aligned JPEG forgeries.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
false positive rate
tr
u
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
FDF-16 - FDF-128
FDF-16
FDF-128
others
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
false positive rate
tr
u
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
FDF-F/F1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
false positive rate
tr
u
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
FDF-F/AUC
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
false positive rate
tr
u
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
FDF-A
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
false positive rate
tr
u
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
BG-CDA
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
false positive rate
tr
u
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
CDA
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
false positive rate
tr
u
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
I-CDA
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
false positive rate
tr
u
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
BAG
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
false positive rate
tr
u
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
CAGI
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
false positive rate
tr
u
e
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ra
te
CNN
Fig. 4. Receiver operation characteristics (ROC) for all 4,620 test images.
Note that we expected reasonable detection results for cases
with low Q1 and high Q2 where blocking grid discontinuity
can be observed (see Section III-F for more details).
2) Coefficient distribution analysis: All of the methods
based on coefficient distribution analysis (CDA, I-CDA and
BG-CDA) delivered good results with best performance for
low false positive rates. Surprisingly, the best results were
obtained for the I-CDA method which uses a simpler model
of the problem than the newer BG-CDA.
3) First digit features: The methods based on first digit
features delivered uneven performance. The algorithm FDF-
A delivered very poor results, which may indicate either an
implementation problem (I used the one from the image foren-
sics toolbox [2]), a classifier training problem, or sub-optimal
scheme design (e.g, insufficient number of features). Note that
I used pre-trained classifiers included in the image forensics
toolbox (trained as described in the original paper [7]) which
were available for Q2 ∈ {50, 55, . . . , 95}. Remaining quality
levels were processed by the closest available classifier. This
explanation would manifest itself as a regular grid in the re-
sults arranged by (Q1, Q2) configurations (see Section III-F).
On the other hand, the set of multi-scale detectors (FDF-
16 - FDF-128) delivered superior F1 scores and decent ROC
performance. The main problem appears to be a considerable
shift towards higher false positive rates caused by unreliable
response maps for some of the more challenging compression
settings. As already observed in Section 2 on parameter
selection, this problem can be successfully addressed by
discarding unreliable maps - as performed by the multi-
scale fusion procedure. Surprisingly, both F1-driven and AUC-
driven parameter configurations yielded similar F1 scores -
both considerably better than for any of the candidate maps. As
expected, the AUC-driven configuration yielded much better
results for low false positive rates - on par with the best CDA
schemes.
4) Deep learning: The CNN-based detector delivers com-
petitive F1 score performance, but tends to generate noisy
and unreliable response maps for challenging (Q1, Q2) con-
figurations (see Section B for examples). This leads to im-
paired low false positive rate performance. In contrast to
FDF detectors whose unreliable maps resemble Gaussian noise
centered around 0.5, the CNN-based detector often yields
highly confident scores - visible as high-contrast noise (see
the last example in Fig. 7).
F. Performance Variation with JPEG Quality Levels
This section analyzes the obtained results for various com-
pression settings. Fig. 5 shows the average maximal F1 scores
(the best result for each image) for all (Q1, Q2) configurations.
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Fig. 5. Localization results (F1 scores) for various combinations of JPEG quality factors Q1 and Q2; It can be observed that detectors operating on smaller
blocks deteriorate in performance when Q2 ≈ Q1 and Q1 ≥ 96 when test images resemble singly compressed JPEGs; reported F1 scores correspond to the
average over all tested compression configurations.
The most important observation is that small-window detectors
tend to have problems if Q1 ≈ Q2 and for Q1 ≥ 96. These are
challenging cases which can be easily confused with uniformly
single-compressed images. However, as the analysis window
increases, and more reliable statistics can be collected, the
reliability scope expands. This can be clearly observed for
the set of multi-scale detectors, which gradually improve their
scope. Windows of size 48×48 px appear to be large enough,
as the scope’s growth clearly saturates. Larger windows hardly
improve in scope, but start to deteriorate in F1 scores due to
limited localization precision. Configurations with Q1 > 99
remain out of reach even for the largest considered windows.
The observed results confirm our expectations towards
blocking artifacts grid analysis. These algorithms visibly im-
prove for low Q1, high Q2 configurations which feature weak
or missing grid in the tampered areas. Even though the newer
CAGI detector considerably improves upon the original BAG
detector, the results are still not competitive with respect to
other types of detectors.
The FDF-A detector revealed weird behavior with structured
areas of somewhat better performance and zeroed scores oth-
erwise. Surprisingly, the observed structures do not correspond
to a regular grid that could have been expected from the quality
levels involved in classifier training. Moreover, even for the
best configurations, the performance is not competitive with
respect to other detectors.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The presented evaluation has shed more light on JPEG
compression settings where reliable forgery localization can
be expected. While it is commonly known that configurations
with Q2 ≤ Q1 are challenging, the remaining cases are
often perceived as feasible or even easy (although cases
with small difference between quality levels are known to
be somewhat harder). To large extent, this simplification
stems from common contraction of experimental setups to
quality factors being multiples of 5 or 10. The fine-grained
evaluation performed in this study assessed the performance
and reliability scope of popular state-of-the-art JPEG forgery
detectors, and demonstrated that many detectors deteriorate as
Q1 decreases, which leads to progressively wider gap between
Q2 and Q1. Moreover, extremely high quality levels of the first
compression (Q1 ≈ 100) are also challenging as such images
have weak compression traces and could pass as uncompressed
ones.
The above observations are particularly true for precise
detectors which operate on individual image blocks. When
larger analysis windows are used (e.g., 64 × 64 px), more
reliable statistics can be collected, and reliability scope can
improve. Overall, the reliability scope can be approximately
described as follows:
Q2 > Q1 + θ1,
Q1 < 100− θ2,
(6)
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF LOCALIZATION PERFORMANCE, AVERAGE PROCESSING
TIME (2 MPX IMAGES; MATLAB IMPLEMENTATION) AND AVERAGE SIZE
OF CLASSIFIER DATA (PER TARGET QUALITY LEVEL).
Detector F1 AUC0.1 Time [s] Storage [MB]
CDA .41 .47 1.0 -
I-CDA .59 .72 0.5 -
BG-CDA .50 .55 4.0 -
BAG .18 .08 2.6 -
CAGI .24 .12 3.1 -
FDF-A .23 .06 72.2 0.3
FDF-16 .61 .34 171.4 1.0
FDF-32 .71 .37 137.2 2.3
FDF-48 .71 .32 94.4 3.3
FDF-64 .70 .26 72.4 4.1
FDF-80 .67 .21 60.5 4.7
FDF-96 .65 .17 57.7 5.3
FDF-112 .62 .15 51.2 5.7
FDF-128 .59 .13 49.9 5.9
CNN .61 .23 16.8 / 882.51 3.6
1 computation time on GPU / CPU
where θ1 is proportional to 100 − Q1, and both θ1 and θ2
decrease with analysis window size and tend to increase for
quality-oblivious detectors.
Overall, I observed the best localization results for the fam-
ily of CDA detectors and for my multi-scale FDF detectors.
The CDA detectors were particularly beneficial for low false
positive rates. The FDF detectors delivered better F1-score
performance which could be further improved with multi-
scale fusion. The fusion procedure could also be configured to
more aggressively discard unreliable candidate maps leading
to significant improvement of low false positive performance.
The key advantages of CDA detectors include the lack of de-
tector training and low computational complexity (see Table III
for a detailed comparison of average run-times). All classifier-
based detectors incur much higher computational cost. Note
that the presented results were obtained with unoptimized
Matlab implementations on a common Core i7 PC (i7-4771
CPU @ 3.50GHz) and hence are susceptible to improvement
by code optimization or low-level C/C++ implementation.
Computational complexity could also be reduced by increasing
the sliding window stride, although possibly at the cost of
localization performance. The two figures reported for the
CNN detector correspond to the GPU and CPU processing
time respectively. The utilized graphics card was GeForce
GTX 760 with 2 GB of RAM.
Classifier-based detectors also require storage space for the
trained classifier parameters. This may be particularly ex-
pensive for quality-aware detectors, where separate classifiers
are trained for each JPEG quality level. The average size of
classifier data, stored in Matlab’s *.mat files, is collected in
Table III. Oblivious detectors allow to significantly reduce stor-
age requirements, but bare considerable performance penalty
(see Appendix A for quantitative assessment).
Finally, when considering classifier-based detectors one
needs to take into account their generalization capabilities.
For the described multi-scale FDF-based detectors, I observed
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Fig. 6. Comparison of tampering localization performance for quality-
aware and oblivious detectors (CNN and FDF-64): (top) receiver operation
characteristics; (middle) overall F1 and AUC scores; (bottom) F1 scores for
various compression settings.
good generalization. The original classifiers were trained on
gray-scale UCID images. In this study, these classifiers per-
formed very well for color images captured with 4 different
cameras (good results were also obtained in the original study
for grayscale BOSS images [8]). On the other hand, I was
unable to obtain similar generalization for the CNN detector. A
classifier trained on gray-scale UCID images yielded random
results on the color test images, regardless of the adopted color
conversion procedure2.
APPENDIX A
QUALITY-AWARE VERSUS OBLIVIOUS DETECTORS
Quality-aware detectors incur considerable cost for storing
the trained classifiers’ parameters (as shown in Table III). One
possible way of addressing this problem involves adoption
of a quality-oblivious approach which uses a single, general
classifier. However, this saving in storage requirements incurs
a performance penalty.
This appendix quantifies this performance penalty and
presents a detailed comparison between quality-aware and
oblivious versions of two detectors - the FDF and CNN
detectors - both operating on 64×64 px windows. The obtained
results are shown in Fig. 6. In both cases, adoption of the
oblivious approach leads to considerable deterioration of all
performance metrics, including F1 scores, AUC scores, and
2I also tried reading the bitmap file followed by manual YCbCr conversion
and reading the luminance channel from the JPEG file followed by inverse
DCT transform.
reliability scopes. The scale of deterioration differs between
the detectors - the FDF detector generalizes visibly better.
APPENDIX B
LOCALIZATION EXAMPLES
Example tampering probability maps for all of the consid-
ered detectors are shown in Fig. 7. The included examples
cover several configurations of JPEG compression to demon-
strate the behavior of the detectors in various conditions. It
can be observed that small-window detectors, e.g., CDA or
FDF-16, become less reliable when the difference between
successive JPEG quality levels is small.
Thanks to better statistics, large-window detectors, e.g.,
CNN or FDF-64, are more robust - both to small quality level
differences and to low-information image areas. Compared to
the CNN detector, whose unreliable maps tend to represent
high-contrast noise, unreliable maps from the multi-scale FDF
detectors often converge towards low-contrast Gaussian noise
(with probabilities oscillating around 0.5).
Detectors based on blocking grid analysis perform poorly.
The BAG detector typically yields completely unreliable maps
with high contrast between regions of distinct content. It
becomes difficult to distinguish maps with reliable localization
from completely unreliable maps. The newer CAGI detectors
appears to be working considerably better. While the response
maps are overly smooth and attenuated, the tampered regions
often form distinct shapes.
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Fig. 7. Tampering probability maps obtained with the considered detectors for example probe images with various compression settings (see vertical labels); ground truth maps are overlaid in red on the
tampered image (1st column).
